Let’s begin with the bottom line: “In sum, we conclude that email service on the Chinese defendants is prohibited by the Hague Service Convention, and thus improper under Rule 4(f)(3).” Smart Study Co., LTD. v. Acuteye-US, No. 24-313, slip op. at 19 (2^nd Cir. December 18, 2025). Now how did we get here? It all began with a typical “Schedule A” case.

For those unfamiliar with Schedule A cases, here is a primer:

A typical Schedule A case follows a well-worn path: the plaintiff files a complaint, generally under seal and often under a pseudonym. Along with the complaint, the plaintiff also files motions to restrain the defendants' assets held in online marketplace accounts (most defendants are foreign storefronts doing business on popular e-commerce platforms such as Amazon, Etsy, and Walmart) and to enter a temporary restraining order barring further infringement. But these requests are typically not litigated in adversarial fashion, as plaintiffs almost always seek and obtain leave to proceed under seal and ex parte. By the time any defendant appears in the case, it is most often after the defendant's account has been frozen and its funds restricted. Schedule A cases almost exclusively get resolved after the entry of a preliminary injunction, dismissal of some defendants, settlements with others, and a default judgment against the remainder.

Eicher Motors Ltd. v. The P'ships & Unincorporated Ass'ns Identified on Schedule “A”, No. 25-cv-02937 at 1-2 (N.D. Ill. Aug 08, 2025).

There is one additional crucial detail: the initial relief via a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction will also typically include a request for alternative service under Rule 4(f)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (which allows service “by other means not prohibited by international agreement”) permitting the defendants to be served the summons and complaint by email or by emailing a link to a website containing the summons and complaint. See, e.g., Smart Study at 10.

The Smart Study case followed this typical path, including securing leave to serve the summons and complaint by email. See Smart Study at 10. After dismissing two parties who made an appearance to challenge the preliminary injunction, Smart Study obtained a default judgment against 49 defendants for whom it did not have a physical address. So far there was nothing problematic because under Article I of the Convention on Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965 (the “Hague Service Convention”), “[t]his Convention shall not apply where the address of the person to be served with the document is not known.” However, as to two other defendants with known addresses, the district court issued an order to show cause why the action should not be dismissed, ultimately concluding that email service on those defendants was improper under Rule 4(f)(3) and that it thus lacked jurisdiction to enter a default judgment. See Smart Study at 12.

As noted above, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court in a case of first impression. The Court noted China’s formal objection to service of documents by postal channels, which service is permitted by default under Article 10 of the Hague Service Convention if not objected to. The Court further acknowledged the Supreme Court’s admonition that the Hague Service Convention “pre-empts inconsistent methods of service wherever it applies.” Water Splash, Inc. v. Menon, 581 U.S. 271, 273 (2017) (cleaned up). The Court concluded that email service was one such inconsistent method, the implication being that it is inconsistent with China opting out of service by postal channels. See Smart Study at 12. Thus, one cannot serve process on a Chinese defendant under Rule 4(f)(3). Service under Rule 4(f)(2) is also unavailable because it only applies “if there is no internationally agreed means.” See Smart Study at 19-20 & n.3. The Court also ruled that without proper service of process, the district court lacked personal jurisdiction to enter a default judgment. See Smart Study at 20.

What are the implications of Smart Study for parties to Schedule A cases? Due to the absence of caselaw on this issue from other circuits, it is likely to be widely cited in Schedule A litigation around the country. Given that this is the season for New Year predictions, I predict that plaintiffs in these actions will argue that the ruling narrowly applies to jurisdiction to enter a default judgment, and that all other exercises of personal jurisdiction district courts typically employ in these actions is not implicated (including jurisdiction over preliminary injunctive relief). I similarly predict that defendants in these actions (those who appear to defend themselves anyway) will argue that if the district court lacks personal jurisdiction for the purposes of a default judgment, how can it exercise any personal jurisdiction at all absent formal service under the Hague Service Convention?